智猪博弈与假冒商标控制对策  被引量:1

"Boxed-pigs Game" and the Strategy of Eliminating Trademark Counterfeiting

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作  者:曹新明[1] 

机构地区:[1]中南财经政法大学知识产权研究中心,湖北武汉430073

出  处:《南昌大学学报(人文社会科学版)》2012年第5期73-78,共6页Journal of Nanchang University(Humanities and Social Sciences)

基  金:教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重点项目"与对外贸易有关的知识产权政策研究"(10JJD820014)

摘  要:"智猪博弈"是一种著名的博弈游戏,博弈双方分别是聪明的大猪与小猪,博弈利益是以最有利的方式获得尽可能多的食物。针对该游戏设计的缺点,人们提出了改进方案,采用增量方案或者减量加移位方案,以调动大猪小猪的积极性。商标假冒是现实中普遍存在的现象,不论从理论层面还是现实层面来看,都难以彻底消除假冒商标现象,但可以采取适当措施控制这种侵权行为。利用"智猪博弈"游戏中的增量方案以及减量加移位方案,可以最大限度地控制假冒,保护商标权人的利益,同时也维护消费者的合法权益。"Boxed - pigs game", a game of fighting over food between two pigs, is a famous case of Nash equi- librium. To enhance the motivation of two pigs, an improved scheme based on the analysis of the shortcomings of the game was raised, which used incremental program or reduction plus shift program. Trademark counterfeiting is a common phenomenon, and it is difficult to eliminate it completely either in theoretical or in realistic perspective. However, Trademark counterfeiting can be limited as much as possible by using the incremental program and reduc- tion plus shift program in "boxed- pigs game". In that case,the interests of trademark owners and consumers can be protected well.

关 键 词:智猪博弈 假冒商标 增量方案 减量加移位 

分 类 号:D923.4[政治法律—民商法学]

 

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