上市公司以真实盈余管理逃避高质量审计监督的动机研究  

Listed Firms Use Real Earnings Management to Avoid Supervising from High-quality External Auditors

作　　者：李江涛[1,2] 何苦[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院 [2]北京大学光华管理学院博士后流动站

出　　处：《审计研究》2012年第5期58-67,共10页Auditing Research

基　　金：国家社科青年项目(项目批准号:10CZZ010);中国博士后科学基金(项目批准号:2012M510283)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文选用2008—2010年我国沪深两市所有非金融类上市公司为研究样本,探讨了公司聘用审计师的审计质量和真实盈余管理强度之间的关系,并且结合外部制度环境和行业竞争程度做出了更进一步的深入研究。研究发现,国际"四大"会计师事务所审计的公司,真实盈余管理强度显著大于"非四大"事务所审计的公司,说明我国上市公司具有采用真实盈余管理逃避高质量外部审计的动机。另外,公司的财务状况、公司治理机制以及所有权性质等都会对管理者实施真实盈余管理的动机产生影响。In this article, we choose all non-financial companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from the year 2008 to 2010 as research sample to study the relationship between the quality of outside auditor and the intensive of real earnings management in the companies. By using theoretical analysis, model derivation and empirical test, we focused on and discussed this question. Combining with the external institutional environment and the degree of competition in the industry, we also studied this question much further. Our research has found that the corporates audited by the ＂Bigfour＂ showed significantly greater strength of real earnings management than the corporates audited by ＂Non-Bigfour＂, which suggested that the managers had strong motivations to conduct real earnings management to avoid qualified auditors. We have also found that the corporates＇ financial condition, governance mechanisms and properties of ownership have influence on the motivations of managers to conduct the real earnings management.

关 键 词：审计质量 真实盈余管理 应计盈余管理 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学] F224[经济管理—国民经济]