公司治理、大股东资金占用与盈余质量  

Corporate Governance,Major Shareholder’s Capital Occupying and Earnings Quality

作　　者：王奇 李四海[2] 

机构地区：[1]中联重科股份有限公司 [2]暨南大学管理学院

出　　处：《科学决策》2012年第8期47-72,共26页Scientific Decision Making

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70972080)

摘　　要：论文从大股东资金占用行为的影响因素与行为后果两个角度出发,研究公司治理机制与大股东资金占用行为的关系以及大股东资金占用行为与盈余质量的相关关系。研究结果发现:第一大股东控制程度越高,其占用上市公司资金的可能性越大并且这种现象在国有控股上市公司中更为严重,公司治理综合水平对大股东资金占用程度起到了有效的抑制作用,大股东这种资金占用行为对企业盈余质量具有显著的影响。This article attempts to study the correlation between corporate governance and major shareholder＇s capital occupying, the correlation between major shareholder＇ s capital occupying and corporate governance and earnings quality from the factors and economic consequences of major shareholder＇s capitaloccupying. Our findings are that the largest shareholder significantly increased the probability of major shareholder＇ s capitaloccupying, and the state - owned listed company shares more serious behavior of major shareholder＇ s capitaloccupying, the compre- hensive level of corporate governance play an effective inhibition on the rate of major shareholder＇ s capitaloccupying, the behavior of major shareholder, s capita/occupying has a certain extent on the earnings quality.

关 键 词：公司治理 隧道行为 盈余质量 资金占用 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]