论大股东股权质押与上市公司财务:影响机理与市场反应  

Blockholders' Pledge of Stock Right and Corporate Finance in Public-Listed Companies: Influence Mechanism and Market Reaction

作　　者：艾大力[1] 王斌[2] 

机构地区：[1]中央广播电视大学经济管理学院,北京100039 [2]北京工商大学商学院,北京100048

出　　处：《北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第4期72-76,共5页JOURNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY:SOCIAL SCIENCES

基　　金：北京市属高等学校人才强教深化计划"创新人才建设计划"项目(PHR201006128)

摘　　要：股权质押融资是一种大股东常用的财务融资策略。从理论上分析,大股东股权质押融资后可能会产生控制权让位风险与杠杆化风险,这两类风险可能对上市公司造成负面的影响。因为,大股东可能"易位"而影响上市公司稳定性并造成公司价值受损,大股东过度杠杆化可能产生对上市公司中小股东的利益侵占———利益输送,透过这些机理关系,提出需借助市场反应所要检验的两个命题。In public-listed companies （PLCs） , the pledge of stock right is a widely-accepted financing strategy or tactic for its blockholder（s） or controlling shareholder（s）. However, blockholder＇s pledge of stock right and its influences on PLCs have not been fully discussed theoretically. This paper shows an in-depth analysis of two types of risks （ or troubles） ： controlling shareholders＇ turnover risk and over-leveraged risk of blockholder, which would be confronted by the blockholder（s） when pled- ging, and demonstrates how these risks would have negative potential influences on PLCs. Specifically speaking, the controlling shareholders＇ turnover risk would have a negative impact on PLCs＇ stability with the company value damaged and the over-lever- aged risk of blockholder would lead to tunneling, i.e. bloekholders＇ expropriation of the private benefits from medium and small shareholders. This paper penetrates the mechanism and presents two themes which deem to be tested based on the market reae- tion.

关 键 词：大股东 股权质押 利益输送 市场反应 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]