论成品油定价机制中的有限规制:基于合谋的视角  

The Study of Finite Regulation of Refined Oil Pricing Mechanism:Based on the Angle of Conspiracy

作　　者：李治国[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国石油大学(华东)经济管理学院,山东青岛266580

出　　处：《西安石油大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第5期5-10,共6页Journal of Xi’an Shiyou University:Social Science Edition

基　　金：教育部高校人文社科规划项目(10YJA630038);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(10CX05005B)

摘　　要：利用单期静态博弈分析法、有限期动态博弈分析法和无限期动态博弈分析法对成品油定价机制中寡头厂商的合谋行为进行了分析。研究发现:两家寡头厂商在合谋条件下的收益均高于双方各自独立定产条件下的收益,因此,双方存在进行价格合谋的利益激励。基于此,我国成品油价格形成机制的改革可以考虑采用有限规制等手段。The conspiracy behaviours of oil oligarchy manufacturers in the refined oil pricing mechanism are analysed by means of a single phase static game analysis, dynamic game analysis and indefinite dynamic game analysis method. It is found out from the study that benefits obtained by both oil oligarchy manufacturers under the condition of conspiracy are higher than that in the condition of independence. Therefore, there is in- terest inceentive of pricing conspiracy between both sides. Based on this, it can be considered to use limited regulation means in the reform of our national refined oil pricing forming mechanism.

关 键 词：成品油价格 合谋 有限规制 多重博弈 

分 类 号：F407.22[经济管理—产业经济]