降低“违约责任保证金”有利于中小卖家吗?——基于信号传递理论的博弈分析  

Is it Good for Middle & Small Sellers to Lower the Liability for Breach of Contract Deposit?——A Research of Signaling Model Based on Game Theory

作　　者：钱炳[1,2] 周勤[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,南京210096 [2]常州工学院经济与管理学院,江苏常州213022

出　　处：《软科学》2012年第9期60-65,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(08BJY086)

摘　　要：运用信号传递理论,分析了不同类型的卖家发送不同类型的保障标记信号的均衡:当传递信号成本无差异时,不同类型的卖家混同于不发送信号的精炼贝叶斯均衡;只有传递信号成本在不同类型的卖家之间有差异时,才会产生唯一的分离均衡,即高质量卖家选择发送信号,低质量卖家不发送信号,卖家的类型显示能够有效地解决网络交易中的信息不对称问题。Equilibriums of different sellers transferring different signals are studied based on signaling model. There is a pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium（ PBE）when different sellers have the same cost of transferring signals. When the cost of transferring the signals has difference between the different types of sellers, the separating equilibrium exists. The differ-ent types of sellers help to solve the problems of asymmetric information.

关 键 词：信号博弈 保障标记 精炼贝叶斯均衡 违约责任保证金 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]