基本养老保险制度对个人退休行为的激励程度研究  

The Incentive Effect of China's Basic Pension System on Individual Retirement Behavior

作　　者：彭浩然[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院

出　　处：《统计研究》2012年第9期31-36,共6页Statistical Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(12YJCZH267);广东省哲学社会科学规划项目(GD11YYJ07);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金;广东省高校优秀青年创新人才培育项目;中山大学经济研究所基地建设经费的资助

摘　　要：退休制度改革的一个关键问题是基本养老保险制度对个人退休行为的激励程度。作者通过测算九大行业代表性个体在不同退休年龄的养老保险替代率和边际隐性税率,得到以下结论:我国现行基本养老保险制度对个人退休行为存在普遍的负面激励作用,即会增加提前退休行为出现的概率,并且这种负面激励作用存在着很大的行业差异性,低收入行业的职工面临着更严重的负面激励。在这些结论的基础上,作者对弹性退休制度的精算中性原则进行了反思,并建议我国在进行弹性退休制度设计时,既要消除养老保险制度的负激励作用,又要注意保护低收入行业职工的权益。A critical question in retirement system reform is the incentive effect of basic pension system on individual retirement behavior. In this paper, we calculate the replacement rate and marginal implicit tax rate of representative individuals of nine industries at various retirement ages. The results indicate that there generally exists negative incentive effect of China＇ s current basic pension system on individual retirement behavior, which will increase the possibility of early retirement. In addition, this negative incentive effect varies across industries, and workers in low-income industries face severer negative incentive. Based on these results, we make retrospection about the principle of aetuarially neutral in flexible retirement, and suggest that it is vital to diminish such negative incentive of basic pension system and protect the interests of workers in low-income industries when China considers designing flexible retirement system.

关 键 词：基本养老保险制度 退休行为 边际隐性税率 替代率 

分 类 号：F222.3[经济管理—国民经济]