流域中污染企业治理与退出的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Polluting Enterprises' Treatment and Withdrawal in Watershed

作　　者：罗文兵[1] 阳建辉[1] 邓明君[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南科技大学商学院,湖南湘潭411201

出　　处：《湖南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第5期80-84,共5页Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC630170);湖南省社科基金项目(09YBB146)

摘　　要：近年湖南省综合整治湘江流域水污染取得重大成就,但流域污染企业治理与退出计划执行并不顺利,流域中还不断出现重大企业污染环境事件。从完全信息静态博弈角度,构建了当地政府与污染企业、第三方与污染企业、当地政府和污染企业与上级政府之间的博弈支付矩阵,对各种均衡进行了分析。地方政府在两难处境中往往选择对污染企业妥协,环境污染损害赔偿制度不完善直接导致第三方难以参与环境监管,补偿机制缺失导致污染企业治理与退出不到位,各级政府严格监管是破解当地政府和污染企业合谋的关键。In recent years, Hunan has made significant achievements in comprehensive treatment of the Xiangjiang River＇s water pollution. However, the implementation of the plan for polluting enterprises＇ treatment and withdrawal is not good, and serious environmental pollution incidents have still appeared constantly. In view of this, from the standpoint of complete information static games, this paper builds game pay-off matrixes between local government and polluting enterprises, the third-party and polluting enterprises, local government and pollu- ting enterprises with higher-level government, and analyzes different equalizations. It finds that local government often chooses to compromise with polluting enterprises, and the imperfect environmental damage compensation system directly results in the third-party＇s difficulty to join in environment supervision, the defect of compensation mechanism causes inadequate polluting enterprises treatment and withdrawal, and strict supervision from higher level government is the key point to crack the collusion between local government and polluting enterprises. Lastly, this paper puts forward countermeasures to these problems.

关 键 词：污染企业治理 污染企业退出 完全信息静态博弈 混合战略 

分 类 号：F061.3[经济管理—政治经济学]