软件定价过程中正版商、盗版商及代理商的博弈分析  

Game Analysis on the Software Pricing among Legal Traders,Pirates and Agents

作　　者：刘安民[1] 周继祥[2] 熊春[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南工业大学科技学院,湖南株洲412007 [2]湖南工业大学商学院,湖南株洲412007

出　　处：《湖南工业大学学报》2012年第3期95-99,共5页Journal of Hunan University of Technology

摘　　要：针对正、盗版软件在消费者心目中的差异,通过建立贝特兰德价格博弈模型,探讨了正版软件生产商、盗版软件生产商及代理商之间的价格博弈策略,得出分别使三者利润最大化的均衡价格。最后,通过数值实验分析了随着正、盗版软件在消费者心目中差异的变化,正、盗版软件生产商及代理商的均衡价格、销售量及利润的变化趋势,并得到了具有启发性的结论。Considering differences between the original and pirated software in the minds of consumers,sets up Bertrand Model to study the price competition policy among the original software manufacturers,the pirated software manufacturers and the agents,then gets the equilibrium price that maximize the above three’s profits.By numerical experi-ments analyzes the variation tendency of equilibrium price,sales volume and profits along with the changing of the original and pirated software in the consumer’s minds,and obtains implicating conclusions.

关 键 词：软件定价 价格博弈 利润最大化 

分 类 号：F406[经济管理—产业经济]