回收竞争的逆向供应链回收渠道的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Recycling Channel of Reverse SupplyChain Under Collection Comeptition

作　　者：付小勇[1] 朱庆华[1] 窦一杰[2] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理与经济学部,辽宁大连116024 [2]东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2012年第4期41-51,共11页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(71025002);国家重点基础研究发展计划基金资助项目(2011CB013406);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772085);国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(NSFC71033004);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-08-0082)

摘　　要：为了提高逆向供应链的运作效率,在两个回收商回收价格竞争的逆向供应链的市场结构下,应用演化博弈对逆向供应链回收渠道的决策进行了分析。文章首先描述了两条逆向供应链中处理商对不同回收渠道的选择,分析了两条逆向供应链上的处理商分别采取DD模式、DI模式、ID模式和II模式下逆向供应链的各成员的定价策略;然后运用演化博弈理论在市场机制下和政府参与回收补贴下对逆向供应链的回收渠道决策进行了分析;最后通过数值仿真了逆向供应链回收渠道系统的演化过程。研究结果表明:两条逆向供应链上的处理商都选择直接回收方式时的回收量最大和回收价格最高;回收市场的竞争程度影响回收渠道的演化结果;政府参与回收补贴可以促使处理商选择直接的回收方式的演化稳定策略,有利于整个社会系统。In order to improve the efficiency of reverse supply chain, in the two recyclers and processors by the composition of the reverse recovery of the supply chain competitive market structure, the reverse recovery channel decision was studied based on evolutionary game . this paper describes the processors on the choice of different recycling channels in the reverse logistics, and analyze the pricing strategy of reverse supply chain based on the two-chain taking the DD model , DI mode, ID mode and II mode respectively; then it analyzes the reverse sup- ply chain recycling channels decision in the market mechanism and the government subsidy through evolutionary game theory; Finally, it simulates the evolutionary process of the system. The results show that the recycling number is the largest and the recycling price is the highest When two reverse supply chain processors choose direct recovery method, and the competition degree influences recovery channel evolution results in the recycling market, and government participating in recycling subsidies to encourage processors to choose the evolutionary stable strategy of direct recycling and benefits the whole social system.

关 键 词：管理科学 回收渠道选择决策 演化博弈 处理商 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]