湖域工业初始排污权纳什议价模型研究——以江苏省太湖流域纺织行业为例  

Research on Nash-Bargaining Pricing Model of Initial Discharge Permit of Lake Basin Industry: A Case Study of Textile and Printing Industry in Taihu Lake Basin of Jiangsu Province

作　　者：刘钢[1,2] 王慧敏[1,2] 仇蕾[1,2] 刘高峰[3] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学水文水资源与水利工程科学国家重点实验室,江苏南京210098 [2]河海大学管理科学研究所,江苏南京210098 [3]河海大学商学院,江苏常州213022

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2012年第10期78-85,共8页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大培育项目"非常规突发水灾害事件的应急合作机制与建模仿真"(编号:90924027);国家社会科学基金重点项目"气候变化条件下我国水资源管理问题研究"(编号:10AJY005);国家社会科学基金项目"水污染排放权交易机制与政策研究--以太湖流域为例"(编号:08CJY022);2010江苏省研究生创新基金项目"区域排污许可初始配置多主体自主管理模式及情境仿真研究"(编号:CX10B_049R)

摘　　要：针对湖域工业初始排污权定价问题,文章从多利益相关者合作视角出发,结合我国现阶段基本国情,利用合作博弈理论构建了基于多利益相关者合作的湖域工业初始排污权纳什议价(Nash-Bargaining)定价模型。即在满足湖域水环境排污权总量控制及区域产业规划调整方案的前提下,通过政府主体与行业主体之间考虑议价能力系数λ影响的Nash-Bargaining,求解符合价格约束的行业初始排污权价格的最大满意解。其中,价格约束通过求解行业治污成本函数的Aumann-Shapley值给出。并以江苏省太湖流域纺织染整行业为例,针对湖域工业点源氨氮初始排污权定价问题,对比分析了Nash-Bargaining定价模型与江苏省太湖流域现行氨氮类资源价格,结果表明:议价能力系数λ对Nash-Bargaining定价模型影响显著,λ的合理区间为0.5≤λ≤0.7,现行氨氮初始排污权价格对应于0.3<λ<0.4时的情况,不利于初始排污权资源的可持续利用;现行氨氮初始排污权价格的标准化系数ξ=0.91,以λ=0.6时的价格为例,Nash-Bargaining定价模型所给出的价格的标准化指数ξ=0.85,具有比现行价格更强的资源补偿性能,考虑到太湖流域污染现状,Nash-Bargaining定价模型所得价格可行性更强。因此,建议适当调高氨氮初始排污权价格。Focusing on the pricing problem of industry initial discharge permits allocation in the lake basin area, from the perspective of multi-stakeholders＇ cooperation, based on Chinese fundamental realities, this paper uses cooperation game theory to build a Nash- Bargaining pricing model for the industry initial discharge permits allocation in lake basin area. Under the constraint condition of the total amount control of water environment discharge permits in lake basin area and the region＇s industrial adjustment planning, through the Nash-Bargaining by bargaining power parameter A effect between government and industrial agent, the paper finds the maximum satisfactory solution of industry initial discharge permits pricing under the pricing constraint condition. The constraint condition is given through solving the Aumann-Shapley value of industry＇s pollution treatment function. Taking the textile and dyeing industry of Taihu Lake Basin of Jiangsu Province, focusing on pricing problem of the industrial point source NH3-N initial discharge permits, making a comparative analysis between Nash-Bargaining pricing model and the current NH3-N resources price in Taihu Lake Basin of Jiangsu Province, the paper draws following results： bargaining power parameter A has an obvious impact on Nash-Bargaining pricing model; the reasonable range of A is 0.5≤A≤0.7; when the present price of NH3-N initial discharge permits is 0.3 〈 A 〈 0.4, it is not beneficial to sustainable use of initial discharge permits resource; if the present price of NH3-N initial discharge permits standardized coefficient is r =0.91, the pricing A =0.6, the standardized coefficient under the Nash-Bargaining pricing model is ξ = 0. 85, and resource compensation performance is better than the present price. Considering about the pollution situation of the Taihu Lake Basin, the Nash-Bargaining price will have better pricing feasibility. Thus, authors suggest the initial NH3-H discharge permits price should be increased.

关 键 词：湖域工业点源 初始排污权 Nash-Bargaining 定价模型 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]