CoP: An Ultra-Lightweight Secure Network Coding Scheme via Last Forwarder's Proof  

作　　者：Wei Ren Linchen Yu Liangli Ma 

机构地区：[1]School of Computer Science,China University of Geosciences,Wuhan 430074,China [2]Shandong Provincial Key Laboratory of Computer Network,Jinan 250014,China [3]Department of Computer Engineering,Naval University of Engineering,Wuhan 430033,China

出　　处：《Tsinghua Science and Technology》2012年第5期599-605,共7页清华大学学报（自然科学版（英文版）

基　　金：Supported by the Open Research Fund from the Shandong Provincial Key Laboratory of Computer Networks (No.SDKLCN-2011-01);the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, China University of Geosciences(Wuhan) (Nos. 110109 and 090109);the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61170217)

摘　　要：Network coding can improve network efficiency by extending copy-and-forward paradigm to code-and- forward paradigm. It thus imposes a security problem called pollution attack that some network coding or forwarding nodes may intentionally fabricate, modify, forge, or drop packets. Recently, many authentication methods are proposed to guarantee the correctness of encoding and forwarding results via the verification from receivers. Those methods include homomorphic hashing, homomorphic message authentication code, and homomorphic signature. However, those schemes result in expensive computation overhead due to the homomorphic cryptographic primitives, so that those methods will not be able to work in most applications that confront resource constraints. In this paper, we propose an ultra-lightweight checking protocol to guarantee the secure network coding without any homomorphic cryptographic primitives. The extensive analysis proofs that it has following advantages： the least security assumption for intermediate nodes, the least cryptographic primitive requirement, ultra-lightweight computation, flexible message length with probably proof, and minimal rounds in terms of message exchanging.Network coding can improve network efficiency by extending copy-and-forward paradigm to code-and- forward paradigm. It thus imposes a security problem called pollution attack that some network coding or forwarding nodes may intentionally fabricate, modify, forge, or drop packets. Recently, many authentication methods are proposed to guarantee the correctness of encoding and forwarding results via the verification from receivers. Those methods include homomorphic hashing, homomorphic message authentication code, and homomorphic signature. However, those schemes result in expensive computation overhead due to the homomorphic cryptographic primitives, so that those methods will not be able to work in most applications that confront resource constraints. In this paper, we propose an ultra-lightweight checking protocol to guarantee the secure network coding without any homomorphic cryptographic primitives. The extensive analysis proofs that it has following advantages： the least security assumption for intermediate nodes, the least cryptographic primitive requirement, ultra-lightweight computation, flexible message length with probably proof, and minimal rounds in terms of message exchanging.

关 键 词：covert network coding security pollution attack secure protocol 

分 类 号：TP393.08[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术] TN919.31[自动化与计算机技术—计算机科学与技术]