林农合作组织与公司合作的违约博弈分析  

The Analysis of the Default Game in the Cooperation between Forestry Cooperation Organization and Company

作　　者：张浩[1,2] 张智光[1,2] 张红霄[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京林业大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210037 [2]南京林业大学环境与发展系统工程研究所,江苏南京210037

出　　处：《学术探索》2012年第11期99-103,共5页Academic Exploration

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70873059);"十一五"国家科技支撑计划(2006BAD32B08);国家社科基金重点项目(10AJY006);中国集体林权制度改革跟踪研究

摘　　要：构建了演化博弈模型并结合具体的案例分析林业合作组织与公司合作中的违约行为。研究表明:违约不是立即形成的,通常要经历一个不稳定的中间过程,参与人的理性程度和他人的策略共同决定了博弈演化的路径和结果。合理设计合作方案、丰富合作的内容和形式、提高对长期收益的认可程度、建立有效的违约监管机制、加强合作组织的规范管理等措施有助于减少违约行为的发生。This paper builds an evolutionary game model to analyze the default behavior in the cooperation between forestry co- operation organization and company with a specific case. The results show as follows. Default is not formed immediately, and it will usually experience an unstable middle process. The path and result of evolutionary game should be decided by player＇s ra- tional degree and other persons＇ strategy together. Some measures would be helpful for reducing the happening of the default be- havior, such as： designing cooperation plan reasonably, diversifying the cooperative contents and forms, improving the recogni- tion degree for the long - term benefits, establishing an effective default supervision mechanism and strengthening cooperation organizations＇ standards management.

关 键 词：林业合作组织 公司 违约行为 博弈分析 

分 类 号：D922.298[政治法律—经济法学]