我国农村金融制度变迁的路径选择:动态演化博弈视角  

Path Choice in the Transition of Financial System in Rural Areas:From the Perspective of Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：鄂冰[1,2] 巴红静[3] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学,北京100029 [2]中国农业银行采购管理部,北京100005 [3]东北财经大学杂志社,辽宁大连116023

出　　处：《南通大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第5期110-115,共6页Journal of Nantong University:Social Sciences Edition

摘　　要：动态演化博弈理论是把演化理论分析和动态演化过程分析结合起来的一种理论。在农村金融制度变迁的路径选择方面,运用动态演化博弈理论模型,分析正规金融和非正规金融的演化状况,得出两者有两个演化均衡稳定策略,即从理论上选择合作和不合作都是稳定的。通过对演化过程中初始成本、农业投资回报率、政府政策的具体分析,得出正规金融和非正规金融动态演化在实际中必然选择走向合作。我国对非正规金融的态度从围追堵截,单打独斗、各自发展到寻求合作、优势互补的发展现实也证明了这一点。农村金融市场上新型金融组织形式的出现和蓬勃发展正是对两者合作的实践证明。Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory is a combination of evolution theory analysis and dynamic evolution analysis. Focusing on the process of path choice, this essay is based on the theoretic model of dynamic evolutionary game, analyzes the evolutionary patterns of formal and informal finances, and finds that both forms of finances are stable. By an- alyzing the initial cost, rate of benchmarks from investment on agriculture and governmental policies, the essay holds that both forms of finances choose to cooperate unavoidably. The practice of informal finance in the transition from obstruction and separation to cooperation also proves this point to be true. The emergence and prosperity of new forms of financial organizations in the rural areas are evidences of such cooperation.

关 键 词：农村金融 路径选择 动态演化博弈 

分 类 号：F832.35[经济管理—金融学]