农村信用社产生的制度经济学分析  

An Analysis of the Institutional Economics Emerging from the Rural Credit Cooperatives

作　　者：周脉伏[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京信息科技大学经济管理学院,北京100192

出　　处：《江西财经大学学报》2012年第5期65-70,共6页Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：中国的农村信用社是在政府的扶持下产生的。政府为了获得信用社制度之外所不能获得的利益,供给了信用社制度,并且以政府自己信誉和组织成本投资于信用社,成为信用社的投资人。政府在供给信用社制度之后,成功地控制了信用社,政府对信用社控制的成功在于社员从信用社退出的成本高昂,信用社的政府产权深深地影响着信用社制度的演进。In China,the birth of the rural credit cooperatives is supported by governments.To obtain the interests which could not be gained beyond the system of the credit cooperatives,the governments supplied the credit cooperatives with the system,invested the cooperatives with their creditworthiness and organizational cost and became the investors of the cooperatives.After supplying the credit cooperatives with the system,the governments have succeeded in controlling the credit cooperatives.This success lies in the huge cost for the members to retreat from the cooperatives.The governmental property right in the cooperatives has deep impacts on the evolution of the system of the credit cooperatives.

关 键 词：农村信用社 政府信誉 制度变迁 

分 类 号：F830.6[经济管理—金融学]