交叉性金融创新的监管套利路径与博弈策略  

The Regulatory Arbitrage Paths and Game Strategies of Cross-industries Financial Innovation

作　　者：宋婷婷[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学工商管理学院,四川成都610065

出　　处：《上海金融》2012年第10期57-61,117,共5页Shanghai Finance

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(08AJY045)<通过促进企业平衡较快发展保持经济稳定;金融稳定和资本市场稳定的对策研究>阶段性成果

摘　　要：金融危机以来,"监管套利"被多个国家和国际组织视为引发危机的一个重要因素。当前国内金融监管套利的易发部位和治理难点即存在于跨部门的交叉性金融创新中。本文从金融功能交叉、渠道交叉、政策许可交叉等视角考察了交叉性金融创新对金融机构经营策略、业务形态、交易条件的实质性影响,并由此归纳了监管套利的三类路径和手法特征。同时,通过基于非竞争性金融监管环境和非对称信息条件下的套利行为与监管博弈分析,考察了有效监管的关键性条件,并就减少政策制度重构时滞以及强化金融机构的自我约束机制提出了具体策略建议。Since the financial crisis,regulatory arbitrage has been regarded as one of the most important factors causing the crisis by many countries and international organizations.In the current,the domestic main problem about financial regulatory arbitrage lies in the cross-industries financial innovation.This paper investigates the substantive effect of cross-industries financial innovation on the business strategy,business forms,trading conditions from the perspectives of financial function,marketing channel,policies permit,and draws the conclusion about the types and paths of regulatory arbitrage.Meanwhile,this paper investigates the key conditions of effective supervision with the game analysis based on non-competitive financial regulatory environment and asymmetric information,and puts forward specific strategic suggestions.

关 键 词：交叉性金融 监管套利 博弈策略 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]