地方政府行为与企业研发投入——基于中国省际面板数据的实证分析  

The Effect of Local Governments' Behavior on Corporate R&D Investment——Empirical Analysis Based on China's Provincial Panel Data

作　　者：顾元媛[1] 沈坤荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学经济学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2012年第10期77-88,共12页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"增强自主创新能力提升经济增长质量"(批准号71073076);国家社会科学基金重大招标项目"贯彻落实科学发展观与加快转变经济发展方式研究"(批准号07&ZD009);南京大学人文社会科学"985工程"改革型项目"提升自主创新能力问题研究"(批准号NJU985FW01)

摘　　要：本文从官员激励视角研究了在现行政府治理架构下,官员晋升竞争与财政分权对政府研发(R&D)补贴的影响,并将R&D补贴和治理环境内生到企业决策模型中,探寻我国企业R&D投入激励不足的原因。实证检验表明,传统以GDP为考核标准的晋升竞争显著降低了政府对企业的R&D补贴,地方政府财权与事权的不匹配也会减少政府研发补贴,进而影响企业研发投入。企业所处地区治理环境对企业R&D活动有显著的正面影响,政府干涉越少、寻租空间越小,企业越倾向于进行研发活动,R&D投入强度也随之提高。本文的结论对于加快地方政府转型,促进经济发展方式根本转变具有启示意义。From the perspective of official encourage, this paper studies how the competition for promotion and fiscal decentralization affect government R＆D subsidy under governance structure. We put government R＆D subsidy and governance environment into enterprise decision model to seek the reason of inadequate corporate R＆D investment. We find that competition for promotion reduces the quantity of government R＆D subsidy significantly and remarkably, and non-matching between financial powers and range of expenditures will also reduce R＆D subsidy, thereby affecting the corporate R＆D investment. Governance environment has a positive effect on corporate R＆D activities. Companies tend to carry out R＆D activities if government interference and the space of rent- seeking reduced. The conclusion has important policy implication for accelerating the transformation of local government and promoting fundamental change in the mode of economic development.

关 键 词：晋升竞争 财政分权 治理环境 R&D投入 

分 类 号：F063.1[经济管理—政治经济学]