基于委托代理的电子政务服务外包的激励模型研究  

The Analysis of the Incentive Model about E-government Services Outsourcing Based on the Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：万青[1] 何有世[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2012年第19期206-209,共4页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：江苏省软科学基金项目"江苏省软件外包产业竞争力分析与对策研究"(BR2008023)

摘　　要：以委托代理理论为基础,对电子政务服务外包的激励模型进行了研究,分别构建了对称和非对称信息两种情况下政府对运营企业的激励模型。在模型的基础上,定量地得出了政府对运营企业的最优激励合同以及运营企业的最优努力水平。最后,对结果进行了比较分析,为电子政务外包项目中政府与运营企业间的激励提供了一定的理论指导。In this paper, the incentive model about e-government service outsourcing is studied based on the principal - agent theory, and the incentive models that the government designs for operating companies under the two cases of sym- metric and asymmetric information are constiucted respectively. Then based on the model, the optimal incentive contract for operations companies and the optimal level of effort that business would pay are obtained quantitatively. Finally, this paper has comparatively analyzed the results, and provided some theoretical support for the incentive between the govern- ment and the operating companies in the e - government service outsourcing project.

关 键 词：电子政务 服务外包 委托代理 激励模型 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]