不完全信息环境下的企业价格竞争研究  

Price competition of enterprises under the environment of incomplete information

作　　者：谢逢洁[1] 陇小渝[1] 武小平[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安邮电大学管理工程学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《西安邮电学院学报》2012年第5期101-107,共7页Journal of Xi'an Institute of Posts and Telecommunications

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金资助项目(12YJCZH226);西安邮电学院中青年基金资助项目(1040403;1040401)

摘　　要：在经典价格竞争模型-伯川德模型的基础上,采用演化博弈理论和方法研究不完全信息条件下企业价格竞争的发生机理。结果表明:产品消费者价格敏感度、企业降价幅度及降价企业的类型都约束着激烈价格竞争的发生;较多企业在不进行价格合谋的条件下,可以自发演化为价格不变,从而从不完全信息的角度解决了伯川德悖论,揭示了企业价格竞争的内在机理。From the perspective and method of the evolutionary game theory, the occurrence mechanism of price competition of enterprises under the environment of incomplete information is discussed. Results show that the sensitivity degree of consumers to the price of product, the de- creasing extent of price, and the type of enterprise which decreases price, restrain the occurrence of intense price competition. Under the situation where price collusion is absent, a large quantity of enterprises can spontaneously evolve to the state that the price is invariable. So, the Bertrand paradox is resolved from the perspective of incomplete information, and the inherent mechanisms of price competition of enterprises are discovered.

关 键 词：不完全信息 价格竞争 伯川德悖论 演化博弈 

分 类 号：U491[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]