Tunneling, Information Asymmetry, and Private Placement Discounts  

作　　者：Dan He Nana Wang 

机构地区：[1]School of Business,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China

出　　处：《Frontiers of Business Research in China》2012年第3期325-346,共22页中国高等学校学术文摘·工商管理研究（英文版）

基　　金：Acknowledgments This paper is supported by the National Social Science Foundation of China （No. 10CJY007） and the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics （2010XG072）. We greatly appreciate the extensive assistance from Katherine Ye, Xiaoqin Qi, and Yichen Deng.

摘　　要：Private placement has become an increasingly important method of equity refinancing for regulators, listed companies, and investors. This paper analyzes factors influencing private placement discounts based on the controlling shareholder＇s opportunistic behavior and information asymmetry. Our findings indicate that the type of subscriber is a key determinant of the private placement discount, particularly when the subscriber is the controlling shareholder. Asymmetric information between listed companies and investors is another important determinant： The higher the degree of information asymmetry, the greater the private placement discounts.Private placement has become an increasingly important method of equity refinancing for regulators, listed companies, and investors. This paper analyzes factors influencing private placement discounts based on the controlling shareholder＇s opportunistic behavior and information asymmetry. Our findings indicate that the type of subscriber is a key determinant of the private placement discount, particularly when the subscriber is the controlling shareholder. Asymmetric information between listed companies and investors is another important determinant： The higher the degree of information asymmetry, the greater the private placement discounts.

关 键 词：TUNNELING information asymmetry private placement DISCOUNT 

分 类 号：U455.4[建筑科学—桥梁与隧道工程] F279.246[交通运输工程—道路与铁道工程]