保险消费者保护:市场失灵、政府介入与道德风险防范  

Insurance Consumer Protection: Market Failure,Government Intervention and Prevention of Moral Hazards

作　　者：陈华[1] 王玉红[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学经济研究中心,山东济南250014

出　　处：《保险研究》2012年第10期14-19,共6页Insurance Studies

基　　金：教育部项目:经济刺激计划的陷阱;财政风险及其应对策略(12YJA790008);国家软科学项目:出口结构优化与产业结构调整创新研究--基于出口信用保险视角(2011GXQ4D092);博士后科学基金项目:经济刺激计划的退出策略及其国际比较研究(2011M500267);山东省自然科学基金专项:金融创新支持山东半岛蓝色经济区产业结构升级与转型研究(ZR2011GL014);山东省社科项目:山东半岛蓝色经济区渔业风险保障体系构建:基于互助保险视角(11CJJZ06)

摘　　要：由于保险交易中信息不对称,保险消费者专业知识缺乏,保险消费者维权意识薄弱,保险消费者教育机制不足等原因,保险消费者在保险交易中处于弱势地位。市场在一定程度上可以为保险消费者提供保护,但由于信息不完全,保险消费者诚信问题,委托人—代理人等问题,制约了保险消费者的集体维权行为,使市场失灵,无法自动给保险消费者提供充分的保护。政府要不断提高对保险消费者保护的有效性,并防范保险消费者保护产生的道德风险与逆向选择。Insurance consumers are at a disadvantaged position in insurance transactions due to information asymmetry, consumer＇s lack of insurance knowledge, their weak awareness for safeguarding their rights, and the inadequacy of insurance consumer education mechanism. The market, to some extent, can offer some protection to consumers. But due to information asymmetry, insurance consumer credibility, the agency-principal issue, the ＂used car＂ problem of the insurance market and free riding issues, collective right safeguarding activities are checked which leads to market failure. As a result, the market fails to offer due protection to insurance consumers on its own. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to strengthen consumer protection while guarding against moral hazards and adverse selection problems.

关 键 词：保险消费者 市场失灵 道德风险与逆向选择 

分 类 号：F840[经济管理—保险]