资本自由化、内部资本配置与代理成本  

The liberalization of capital,capital structure and agency costs-empirical evidence from China's new industrial ventures

作　　者：吴晓晖[1] Qi Zeng 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,厦门361005 [2]墨尔本大学金融系

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2012年第10期59-74,共16页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872097;71172056);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NECT-09-0681)

摘　　要：本文从外部制度环境和内部资本配置两个角度,对创业企业代理成本影响因素展开大样本实证研究.研究结果表明,区域的资本自由化程度越高,创业企业的代理成本越低,其中由降低政府干预程度和产权制度创新构成的资本自由化因素作用最为明显.研究还发现,创业企业的内部资本配置对代理成本有着重要影响,具体表现为:1)拥有个人资本或外商资本的创业企业代理成本显著低于拥有国家资本的创业企业,并且外商资本比例或个人资本比例越高,代理成本越低;2)短期负债率的提高能有效降低以营业费用率为表征的代理成本,但却提高了以管理费用率为代表的代理成本,显示现阶段我国债权人治理效应仍然存在一定的局限性.这部分结果在一定程度上也为资本自由化进程对创业企业治理影响机理提供了证据.本文的研究为未来金融改革方向、创业环境政策制定及国有创业企业产权多元化提供了一定的实证依据.In this paper, we empirically investigate the influencing factors of the new industrial venture＇ s agency costs from internal capital allocation to outside institutional environment. We find that capital liberalization can effectively decrease new venture＇ s agency costs, and, in the process of China＇ s capital liberaliza- tion, government and institutional factors are still the most crucial factors for the promotion of new venture＇ s corporate governance. This result also reflects the emphasis of the reform policy. We also find the agency costs increase as government shareholding stakes increase, while the agency costs decrease as individual or foreign shareholding stakes increase. Finally, we find the short-term debt is only helpful to reduce the operation expense rate. These results could provide part of the theoretical basis for the policy of entrepreneurship and reform to diversity the ownership structure of new state-owned ventures.

关 键 词：创业企业 资本自由化 内部资本配置 代理成本 

分 类 号：F061.5[经济管理—政治经济学]