政府推动煤矿实施逆向物流的委托-代理问题研究——以煤废水的再利用为例  

Study on Principal-agent Problem in Government Promotion of Reverse Logistics in Coal Mines:Illustrated with Recycling of Colliery Wastewater

作　　者：张炎亮[1] 谭黎[1] 胡琳琳[1] 

机构地区：[1]郑州大学管理工程系,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《物流技术》2012年第10期97-100,共4页Logistics Technology

基　　金：河南省科技创新杰出人才计划"煤炭生产物流的安全性与效率性评价研究"(2009JR20000307)

摘　　要：以煤废水的再利用为研究对象,政府根据煤矿的生产状况制定煤废水年度排放量区间,然后运用委托-代理理论研究了双方在信息对称与不对称情况下,政府如何设计激励合同促使逆向物流成为煤矿的自主行为。研究结果表明:在信息不对称情况下,煤矿的努力水平与煤矿的直接经济效益因子、环境效益因子和政府对煤矿的奖惩程度成正比,与煤矿的努力成本系数成反比;煤矿的总代理成本随其代理风险规避程度的增强而增加;不确定影响因素的波动越大,煤矿的总代理成本也越高。In this paper, with the recycling of colliery wastewater as the study object, we used the principal-agent theory to study how under information asymmetry and symmetry respectively, the government designed incentive contract to encourage the autonomous implementation of re- verse logistics by coal mine enterprises. We found that, when the information was asymmetric, the effort level of the coal mines was forwardly proportionate to the direct economic benefit factor and environmental benefit factor of the coal mines and to the rewarding or punishing degree of the government to them and inversely so to the effort cost coefficient of the coal mines; the total agent cost of the coal mines increased with the extent to which it avoided the agent risk; and the greater the fluctuation of the influence of uncertain factors was, the higher was the total agent cost of the coal mines.

关 键 词：煤矿 逆向物流 委托-代理 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济] F252.19