高新区企业技术创新扩散的多任务锦标激励机制  

Multi-Task Tournament Mechanism of Enterprise's Technology Innovation Diffusion in High-Tech Industrial Development Zone

作　　者：汪行[1] 郑垂勇[1] 刘卫国[2] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,南京210098 [2]南京信息工程大学博士后流动站,南京210044

出　　处：《江南大学学报（自然科学版）》2012年第5期603-608,共6页Joural of Jiangnan University (Natural Science Edition)　

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70972145);江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究项目(70972145);江苏省软科学研究计划项目(BR2011071)

摘　　要：为提高高新区企业的技术扩散能力,借鉴Holmstrom和Milgrom多任务委托代理模型及Lazear和Rosen锦标机制模型,构建了高新区企业技术创新扩散激励的多任务锦标激励机制模型,并分析得知:如果企业技术创新扩散过程中,面对扩散数量和质量两项任务且两项任务的成本函数相互独立,多任务锦标激励机制将转变为单任务锦标激励机制;如果企业技术创新扩散过程中,面对数量和质量两项任务且两项任务的成本函数相互替代,管委会对于扩散数量的最优激励强度要小于企业只承担扩散数量任务时的最优激励强度,且随着扩散质量收益的增加而降低,随着随机因素的降低而增加。How to improve the enterprises＇ technology diffusion capacity for high-tech industrial development zone is an important measure of building an innovative country. Based on multi-task principal-agent model proposed by Holmstrom and Milgrom and tournament mechanism model proposed by Lazear and Rosen, this paper constructs the multi-task tournament model on technology innovation diffusion between enterprise and high-tech zone management committee. The analysis shows that in the process of technology innovation diffusion, if the enterprises takes on two tasks including diffusion quantity and diffusion qualtity and their cost are independent, multi-task tournament will degrade into single task tournament; if the enterprises faces two tasks and their cost are alternative, the optimal incentive intensity of diffusion quantity is less than the optimal incentive intensity that enterprise only taking on diffusion quantity, and the optimal incentive intensity decreases in diffusion quality benefits and random factors.

关 键 词：技术创新扩散 多任务委托代理 锦标机制 激励模型 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]