企业内部控制信息披露的博弈分析及其启示  

Game Analysis on Information Disclosure of Internal Control and Revelation

作　　者：刘焱[1] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学商学院,辽宁沈阳110036

出　　处：《沈阳大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第5期7-10,共4页Journal of Shenyang University:Social Science

基　　金：辽宁省教育厅人文社会科学项目(W2010195)

摘　　要：运用博弈论分析方法,以委托代理理论为依据,从不完全信息静态博弈的角度对上市公司的内部控制信息披露问题进行了分析,揭示了监管部门的监管频率、处罚成本、上市公司包装内部控制信息披露的成本和上市公司因虚假披露内部控制信息被发现而产生的不利影响程度会影响企业披露内部控制信息的真实性,并试图借鉴美国的做法对完善我国企业内部控制信息披露的制度提出建议。By using the method of game theory,the authenticity of internal control disclosure of listed companies is analyzed from the view of static game with incomplete information based on the Principal-agent Theory.Several factors affect the authenticity of internal control information are found： supervision frequency of regulatory authorities,punishment cost,the cost that listed companies color their internal control information,and the degree of adverse effect when false disclosure of internal control is found by regulatory authorities.Several suggestions are provided for regulating the information disclosure of internal control on listed companies comparing with the relevant laws and regulations in the USA.

关 键 词：内部控制信息披露 不完全信息 静态博弈 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]