产权性质、公司治理与真实盈余管理  

The Nature of Ownership, Corporate Governance and Real Earnings Management

作　　者：顾鸣润[1,2] 杨继伟[1] 余怒涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]云南财经大学会计学院 [2]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2012年第3期255-274,共20页China Accounting Review

基　　金：云南财经大学会计学院余怒涛教授主持的国家自然科学基金项目《上市公司并购中的盈余管理问题》(项目批准号:71062007/G0206)的阶段性研究成果之一

摘　　要：论文首先考察了产权性质对上市公司真实盈余管理活动的影响，发现国有企业的真实盈余管理活动显著高于民营企业。在此基础上，论文基于产权视角考察了公司治理与真实盈余管理活动的关系，发现产权性质显著影响了公司治理对真实盈余管理活动的抑制效果。具体而言，国有上市公司的董事会规模和公司治理综合水平能够显著地降低真实盈余管理，但作为外部公司治理机制之一的独立审计不能有效地抑制国有企业管理者的真实盈余管理活动；民营上市公司的董事会规模和公司治理综合水平对真实盈余管理的影响不显著，但是外部独立审计和董事会独立性能够显著地抑制管理层的真实盈余管理行为。本文的研究表明，产权性质不仅对公司真实盈余管理行为具有重要影响，而且也显著地影响了公司治理机制对真实盈余管理的限制作用。From the point of the ownership of the Chinese listed company, this paper firstly examines the real earriings management behavior of the state-owned company and non- state-owned company. Our result shows that state-owned company did significant more real earnings management than the non-state-owned company. This finding is reasonable since the highly concentrated ownership of the state-owned enterprise many intricate more serious problems of the benefit occupation of small shareholders, to conceal the controlling benefits, the managers or controlling shareholders of the state-owned enterprises may have strong in- centive to do more earnings management including real earnings management to mask true performance of company. On another hand, state-owned companies normally have low bank- ruptcy risk and the managers of Stat^owned enterprises are usually current or former govern- ment bureaucrats, their promotion and compensation are measured more by various political and social objectives than by operating and financial performance. Thus the managers of state- owned enterprises may less care of the negative effect on the operating performance if too more real earnings management has done. Based on the previous findingS, then we examines the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and real earnings management from the perspective of the nature of ownership. This study is focuses on Chinese capital market data which ranges from 2001 2010 and specifically to analyze how the independence of board of directors, the magnitude of cor- porate governance and the size of board influence the real earnings management of the manag- ers. The result firstly suggests that the board of size and the CG_index is negatively correla- ted with real earnings management hut the independent audit is not significantly correlated with real earnings management for the sample of the state-owned enterprises. The independ- ent audit has no significance on the real earnings management of the state-owned enterprise possibly due to the f

关 键 词：产权性质 公司治理 真实盈余管理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]