预算软约束、三方博弈与公共项目监管治理  

Soft Budget Constraint,Three-Side Game Playing and Regulatory Governance of Public Projects

作　　者：后小仙[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院,上海200433

出　　处：《当代财经》2012年第11期35-45,共11页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(12BJY001);教育部人文社科项目(12YJA790047);中国博士后科学基金(20110490063)

摘　　要：政府的投资冲动是突破预算约束的内在动力,现行的行政体制促成了当前我国政府公共项目投资过热的偏好。合理的公共项目监管治理不仅能充分发挥竞争优势,而且还可以形成多方制衡的格局。我国虽逐步建立"三位一体"的公共项目监管机制,但现行的监督机制效果并不理想。构建基于合作契约的公共项目监管治理模式,完善各利益主体间的协调和沟通机制,实现风险的合理分担和矛盾的友好解决,将能够最大限度地规范公共项目投资预算软约束问题。The impulse of the government＇ s investment is the intrinsic motivation to break the budget constraints; the current administrative system contributes to the preferences of over investment of Chinese government into public projects. Reasonable regulatory governance over the public projects can not only give full play to the competitive advantage but also form a pattern of multiple checks and balances. Although China has gradually established a ＂trinity＂ mechanism to regulate public projects, the effect of it is by no means ideal. By taking such measures as to set up a public project regulatory governance mode based on cooperation contracts, to improve the coordination and commu- nication mechanisms between the various stakeholders, and to achieve reasonable risk-sharing and ami- cable settlement of contradictions, the problem of maximum regulation of the soft budget constraints over public project investment can be solved.

关 键 词：预算软约束 公共项目 三方博弈 监管治理 

分 类 号：F812.3[经济管理—财政学]