政府投资代建项目寻租风险规避研究  

Rent-seeking Risk Evasion by CM as Agency for Public Construction Project

作　　者：齐宝库[1] 王欢[1] 张小月[1] 

机构地区：[1]沈阳建筑大学管理学院,辽宁沈阳110168

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2012年第5期48-51,共4页Journal of Engineering Management

基　　金：国家住建部基金资助项目(2011-R3-27);辽宁经济社会发展立项课题(20111slktglx-41)

摘　　要：代建制模式下政府投资的建设工程项目关系复杂,容易因代建单位的投机行为产生寻租风险,而规避寻租风险是政府投资工程项目取得成功的关键因素之一。从分析代建制项目的委托代理关系的角度出发,对政府投资代建项目寻租风险的产生原因进行阐述,结合约束与监督机制建立博弈模型,通过对博弈模型的算例分析证明其适用性和有效性。并运用该博弈模型求解出最优监督成本与最优激励系数,为代建双方签订契约提供参考。该研究方法的提出与应用旨在为政府投资代建项目寻租风险的规避提供理论依据与科学指导。Rent-seeking risk is one of the key factors of success for public construction project. To solve this problem, the reason of rent-seeking behavior is presented based on the relationship between CMs and government clients. Combining with constraint and supervision mechanism, a game model of risk evasion is built and its applicability and effectiveness are tested by the analysis of example. The optimal supervision cost and the optimal incentive coefficient have been solved by the model, which may be referenced by the contract parties. The results provide scientific guidance of rent-seeking risk evasion for public construction project.

关 键 词：风险规避 代建项目 寻租 博弈模型 

分 类 号：TU12[建筑科学—建筑理论]