公共选择与政策民主:外部性困境及其超越  

Public Choice and Policy Democracy:External Plight and Transcendence

作　　者：张敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学人文学院,南京210096

出　　处：《江苏行政学院学报》2012年第6期108-113,共6页The Journal of Jiangsu Administration Institute

基　　金：江苏省社会科学基金项目"公共政策外部性与现阶段人民内部矛盾关系研究"(10ZZC009);江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究指导项目"和谐社会建设中的公共政策外部性问题研究"(2010SJD810005)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：政策民主要求公共选择的结果平等,但人们的公共选择行为却会产生外部性,从而产生政策的歧视性对待。因此,公共选择的外部性与政策民主的要求是相背的。公共选择的外部性与多数主义规则直接相关,但由于多数主义规则是通行的决策规则并具有不可替代的地位,公共选择的外部性就难以消除,外部性问题也因此成为困扰政策民主的一大难题。宪政经济学试图通过立宪改革消除公共选择的外部性进而实现一种原则政治,但由于难以摆脱公共选择理论的范式窠臼,这些改革总是带有一定的局限性。公共选择外部性的消除需要针对公共选择理论的进一步范式超越,而协商民主可以提供一定的借鉴和帮助。Policy democracy requires equality of results in public choice, yet public choice behavior generates exter- nality, resulting in discriminatory policy treatment. Therefore, the externality of public choice oppose the requirements of policy democracy. The externality of public choice is directly related to the majoritarian rule, but since this rule is universal and irreplaceable rule for decision-making, it is hard to eradicate externality of public choice, and the problem of externali- ty remains a tough one that troubles policy democracy. The Constitutional Economics tried to eliminate the externality of public choice through constitutional reform, and continue to achieve principle politics. However, due to the difficulty in breaking down the paradigm stereotype of public choice theories, such reform efforts come with certain limitations. The elimination of externality in public choice requires further paradigm transcendence aimed at public choice theories, and de- liberative democracy can provide some reference and assistance.

关 键 词：公共选择 外部性 政策民主 立宪改革 范式超越 

分 类 号：D63-31[政治法律—政治学]