开发商的囤地行为逻辑及其管制  

The Logic of Illegal Land Reserves of Real Estate Developers and Its Regulations

作　　者：鲍海君[1] 庄红梅 

机构地区：[1]浙江财经学院工商管理学院 [2]江西吉安

出　　处：《现代城市研究》2012年第11期61-66,共6页Modern Urban Research

基　　金：浙江省社科规划“之江青年研究课题”;国家自然科学基金(70803042)

摘　　要：运用演化博弈论分析开发商囤地行为逻辑及群体演化趋势,构建了开发商囤地的演化博弈模型。主要结论:当囤地策略支付为正,且大于不囤地策略支付时,开发商都选择囤地策略;当囤地策略支付为正,但小于不囤地策略支付时,开发商动态选择囤地策略,囤地企业稳定于一定比例;当囤地策略支付为负,且小于不囤地策略支付时,开发商都选择不囤地策略。最后,根据开发商囤地行为逻辑和结论给出了管制策略。In order to explore the logic of illegal land reserves of real estate developers, this paper built an evolutionary game model of the real estate developers. It concluded that when the payment of the strategy of illegal land reserves is positive and greater than the counter strategy, the real estate developer would choose the strategy of illegal land reserves. When the payment of the strategy of illegal land reserves strategy is positive and less than its counter strategy, the real estate developer would dynamically choose the two strategies. When the payment of the strategy of illegal land reserves strategy is negative and less than its counter strategy, the real estate developer would not choose the strategy of illegal land reserves. The regulations were put forward based on the logic of illegal !and reserves of real estate developers.

关 键 词：开发商 囤地 演化博弈论 

分 类 号：F293.3[经济管理—国民经济] F301