不同地区开发商群体的囤地行为机理及其管制  

The Mechanism and Governance on Land Reserve Strategies of the Real Estate Developers in Different Region

作　　者：鲍海君[1] 庄红梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江财经学院工商管理学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《中国土地科学》2012年第9期28-34,F0002,共8页China Land Science

基　　金：浙江省社科之江青年研究课题(11ZJQN025YB);国家自然科学基金(70803042)

摘　　要：研究目的:探讨发达地区和欠发达地区开发商囤地行为决策机理及管制策略。研究方法:演化博弈论方法。研究结果:构建了发达地区和欠发达地区开发商囤地的演化博弈模型,论证了4种情景下两群体的演化稳定策略,并对各种情景进行了现实解释。研究结论:立体化全方位增加开发商囤地成本、全面监察与重点监察相结合以及对发达地区和欠发达地区开发商囤地实行差异化处罚力度可有效管制囤地行为。The purpose of this paper is to explore the mechanism and appropriate governance on land reserve strategies of the real estate developers in the developed and developing regions of China. The paper develops an evolutionary game model for land reserve strategies of real estate developers. The result shows that evolutionary stable strategies for the real estate developers in the developed and developing regions were verified and the practical explanation for the equilibrium of the four scenarios was also discussed. It concluded with the appropriate policies on handling the issues, i.e., increasing the cost of reserving land, combining the comprehensive and emphasized monitoring systems together, and designing different punishment criterion for the developed and developing regions.

关 键 词：土地经济 开发商 囤地 演化博弈论 

分 类 号：F301.2[经济管理—产业经济]