转型经济中产业政策的有效性研究——基于我国各级政府利益博弈视角  

On the Effectiveness of Industrial Policy in a Transitional Economy:From the Angle of Interests Game of Governments at All Levels in China

作　　者：张纯[1,2] 潘亮[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院,上海200433 [2]上海财经大学会计学院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2012年第12期85-94,共10页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272011/G0207);教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目(2009JJD790031)

摘　　要：文章基于我国各级政府利益博弈视角,考察了产业政策的有效性。研究发现:(1)限制性政策未能有效遏制特定产业的银行借款增长率,而鼓励性政策则能够使特定产业持续获得更多银行借款,尤其是长期借款;(2)即使受到产业政策的限制,地方政府仍给予了其控制且与当地经济增长联系紧密的企业较高的借款额度,而且市级政府(地级市、地区、自治州政府)和县级政府(县、县级市、自治县政府)控制的这类企业的借款增长率高于中央政府和省级政府控制的企业,说明政府层级会对产业政策有效性产生影响。This paper studies the effectiveness of industrial policy from the angle of interests game of governments at all levels in China. The results are as follows： firstly, restrictive policies have not efectively curbed the growth rates of bank loans in specific industries ,but encouraging policies can help specific industries to continuously get more hank loans, especially long term loans secondly,local governments provide high loan amounts for firms which are controlled by local governments and are closely related with local economic growth,and the growth rates of bank loans in firms controlled by prefecturelevel and countylevel governments are higher than the ones in firms controlled by central and provincial governments, indicating that gov ernment levels have effects on the effectiveness of industrial policy.

关 键 词：产业政策 银行借款 政府利益 政府层级 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学] F275