财政分权、企业寻租与地方政府补助——来自中国资本市场的经验证据  

Fiscal Decentralization,Corporate Rent-seeking and Local Government Grants and Subsidies:Evidence from Chinese Capital Market

作　　者：许罡[1,2] 朱卫东[1] 张子余[2] 

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学管理学院,安徽合肥230009 [2]安徽财经大学会计学院,安徽蚌埠233030

出　　处：《财经研究》2012年第12期120-127,共8页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71172190);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(11YJA790155);安徽高校省级人文社会科学研究项目(SK2012B010)

摘　　要：文章利用2007-2010年我国A股上市公司数据,实证研究了财政分权、企业寻租与地方政府补助之间的关系。研究发现:(1)总体上看,财政分权程度越高的地区,政府对企业的补助越少,而且企业寻租有助于其获得政府补助;(2)区分不同所有制企业后,财政分权程度越高的地区,政府对国有企业的补助越多,而对非国有企业的补助则越少,说明在政府补助方面存在所有制歧视,国有企业的预算软约束问题依然突出。因此,营造不同所有制经济公平竞争、共同发展的制度环境任重而道远。This paper analyzes the relationship between fiscal decentrali zation, corporate rentseeking and local government grants and subsidies based on the data of Ashare listed companies from 2007 to 2009. It reaches the following conclusions： firstly, on the whole, in regions with higher de grees of fiscal decentralization, governments provide fewer grants and subsi dies for the companies whose rentseeking is conducive to getting govern ment grants and subsidies; secondly, with regard to ownership, in regions with higher degrees of fiscal decentralization, governments provide more grants and subsidies for stateowned enterprises and fewer for private enter prises, showing that there is ownership discrimination in regard to govern ment grants and subsidies, and the problem about soft budget constraints of stateowned enterprises is still prominent. Therefore, it is a tough and longterm task to set up the institutional environment with fair competition and mutual development of different ownership economies.

关 键 词：政府补助 财政分权 政治关联 寻租 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学] F812.2