独立董事与公司违规:合谋还是抑制  

Independent Directors and Violations: Conspiracy or Restrain

作　　者：邓可斌[1] 周小丹[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学财经学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2012年第11期84-94,共11页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：广东省教育厅高水平人材培养项目(wym09095);国家自然科学青年基金项目(71003030);广东省哲学社科规划一般项目(09E-03)

摘　　要：独立董事的监督作用取决于其是否能够抑制公司违规行为,而非提升公司绩效。基于中国上市公司2003～2010年数据,建立联立方程模型并运用logistic分析方法,研究结果表明:一方面,独立董事比例的提升会显著增加公司违规概率,说明独立董事未能抑制公司违规行为,更可能是与公司内部人合谋进行违规行为;另一方面,尽管独立董事不能抑制公司违规,但公司违规行为的发生,仍会使各方对独立董事的作用更为重视,进而提高独立董事比例。进一步的研究表明:独立董事与内部人合谋违规仅限于较轻度的违规行为,独立董事比例与重度违规行为的关系并不显著。Based on combined data of listed companies in China from 2003-2010 by establishing the simultaneous equations model and using the logistic regression analysis method,the authors find： on one hand,the enhancement of the proportion of independent directors will significantly increase the company＇s violation probability,indicating that the directors fail to play a supervisory role in inhibition of company violations,and it will be more likely to collude with corporate insider;on the other hand,when violations occur,interested parties will pay more attention to the role of independent directors,and thus significantly increase the proportion of independent directors.Further empirical evidences show that,the collusion between independent directors and insiders is limited to violations of the lesser degree;the relation between the proportion of independent directors and severe violations is not significant.

关 键 词：独立董事 违规行为 合谋违规 抑制违规 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]