《京都议定书》附件B国家碳排放权贸易与利益分配研究  

Research on Carbon Emissions Trading and Gains Distribution among Annex B Countries of Kyoto Protocol

作　　者：张云[1,2] 杨来科[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学金融与统计学院,上海200241 [2]上海立信会计学院金融学院,上海201620

出　　处：《上海立信会计学院学报》2012年第5期89-96,共8页Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(11BGJ036);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(11YJC790289);上海市教育委员会科研创新项目(12YS147);上海市教育委员会重点学科建设项目(J51703)

摘　　要：文章利用边际减排成本分析附件B国家开展碳排放权贸易的理论基础;完全竞争条件下碳排放权贸易预测结果说明,开展碳排放权贸易后的减排总成本比不开展贸易的减排总成本减少了658亿美元;不完全竞争条件下的附件B国家间碳排放权贸易预测结果说明,进口约束情况下,进口方之间的利益将出现重新分配,部分收益将从减排成本相对较高的进口方转移到相对较低的进口方,供给垄断情况下,进口方将增加实现减排目标的支出,而出口方则增加收益,整个市场成本增加。Based on marginal abatement cost, we analyze the theory basis of carbon emissions trading among Annex B countries. We find that under the condition of perfect competition, the total abatement cost of Annex B countries would reduce 6.58 million USD compared with countries without emissions trading. Further study finds that under the condition of incomplete competition, there are two situations realized. One is under the restriction of import quantity, benefits would be redistributed and partially transform from importers with high reduction cost to those with low reduction cost. The other is under the condition of sup- ply monopoly, reduction expenses would be increased for importers to achieve emissions targets, benefits would be increased for exporters, and the total cost would be increased for the whole market. At last, we make a summary and put forwards suggestions for China to participate in the international carbon emissions market.

关 键 词：附件B国家 碳排放权贸易 利益分配 贸易经济 

分 类 号：F125.4[经济管理—世界经济]