公司破产边缘董事不当激励的法律规制  

Directors' Civil Liability in Vicinity of Insolvency

作　　者：张学文[1] 

机构地区：[1]福建社会科学院法学研究所,福建福州350001

出　　处：《现代法学》2012年第6期93-103,共11页Modern Law Science

摘　　要：董事作出商业决策时的激励结构与公司的经营和财务状况具有直接的相关性。当公司具有持续营业能力时,董事的风险偏好是中性的。可是,当公司处于破产边缘时,董事则具有以债权人的利益为代价实施高风险、高收益商业决策的不当激励。许多国家公司法或破产法都提出了相应的法律策略,以约束董事的这种不当激励并保护债权人的利益。我国破产法应要求债务人承担一般性的破产申请义务,在此基础上,进一步规定董事承担在一定期限内提出破产申请的义务,否则就要对债权人因迟延申请破产所受的损失承担赔偿责任。The incentive structure for directors to make decisions is directly related to operation and finance of a company.Directors＇ risk preference is neutral when the company is a going concern.However,when the company is in the vicinity of insolvency,directors,at the expense of the benefit of creditors,will use perverse incentives to make decisions that are of high risk and high profit.Relative strategies have been conceived in company or bankruptcy laws in many countries to limit directors＇ perverse incentives and protect creditors.China＇s bankruptcy law should require debtors to undertake a general duty to file for bankruptcy,and further specify that directors shall have the duty to file within a limited period or they shall be liable for creditors＇ losses out of the delay of filing.

关 键 词：董事 破产边缘 不当激励 法律规制 

分 类 号：DF411.91[政治法律—经济法学]