基于公平偏好的供应链质量激励机制效率演化  

Efficiency evolution of quality incentive in supply chain based on fairness preference

作　　者：孟庆峰[1] 盛昭瀚[2] 李真[3] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学管理学院,镇江212013 [2]南京大学工程管理学院,南京210093 [3]江苏科技大学经济管理学院,镇江212003

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2012年第11期2394-2403,共10页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(70731002);国家自然科学基金项目(71171099;70971061;71001049;71001028);国家社会科学基金青年项目(10CGL025)

摘　　要：针对供应链质量管理中的群体激励问题.将收益共享契约作为供应商零部件质量改进的激励机制,设计了批发价契约与收益共享契约相结合的菜单式合同.分析出制造商通过设置合理的报酬结构能够实现其收益与零部件质量的"双赢".在此基础上,将公平偏好引入到多阶段群体激励中,研究了公平偏好对激励效果的影响.研究表明:不考虑公平偏好情况下能够取得较好激励效果的报酬结构并不适用于具有公平偏好的多阶段群体激励:个体的公平偏好对激励绩效会产生负面影响;制造商实行同一报酬结构在多阶段激励中难以维持高效率;仅针对单一激励力度进行调整或忽视激励力度间的协同均不能实现较好的激励效果.This paper focuses on the manufacturer how use contract menu which contained wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract to incentive multiple suppliers to improve accessories quality. The manufacturer requires suppliers＇ accessories quality must be measured up and takes revenue sharing contract as incentive mechanism for quality improvement. We found that manufacturer can achieve its income and quality of accessories ＂win-win＂ by setting compensation structure reasonably. Then, we studied the impact of fairness preference which existing in suppliers group on the incentive efficiency. Research shows that： the compensation structure which performed well in group which has no fairness preference can not keep high efficiency when applied to incentive suppliers who have fairness preference, which has negative effects on incentive performance. Any compensation structure which manufacturer adopted can not maintain its primary efficiency when existing fairness preference; only adjust a single incentive factor or neglect the synergy between incentive factors can not achieve a high incentive efficiency.

关 键 词：质量激励 公平偏好 报酬结构 收益共享契约 计算实验 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]