低碳经济发展中政府与企业之间的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Government and Enterprises in the Development of Low-carbon Economy

作　　者：王京安[1] 韩立[1] 高翀[1] 徐昕[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京工业大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211816

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2012年第22期234-238,共5页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"我国低碳经济实现的政策路径研究:基于企业的视角"(71073078);江苏省"青蓝工程"项目

摘　　要：低碳经济的建设既需要政府的政策引导,也离不开企业的积极参与。在考虑政府和企业间目标差异的情况下,运用静态博弈和演化博弈,考察了在低碳经济建设过程中,政府和企业之间的互动机制。静态博弈模型结果表明,政府碳税、低碳补贴、非低碳生产罚款等一系列政策的改变,或者企业自身内部技术条件和外部支持条件的改变,都可有效促使企业进行低碳生产;演化博弈模型结果表明,在合理的制度系统下,有限理性假设条件下的企业将逐步趋向于低碳生产,进而促使经济发展模式向低碳转变。In order to ensure the sustainable economic development, low - carbon economy becomes an efficient econom- ic development model in China. The development of low- carbon economy needs not only the construction of the govern- mentg leading policy, but also the efforts related to the enterprises. The paper discusses the interaction between the gov- ernment and enterprises by using static game theory and evolutionary game theory. The results of the static game theory a- nalysis show that both the government＇ s policies like carbon tax, low - carbon subsidies and the fines of the traditional enterprises and the development of enterprises＇ technology can effectively promote the low - carbon production of the en- terprises. While the results of the evolutionary game analysis show that the limited rational enterprises will gradually tend to low - carbon production under a reasonable system.

关 键 词：低碳经济 政府 企业 静态博弈 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F272F205