地方政府行为、财政—金融关联与中国宏观经济波动——基于中国式分权背景的分析  

The “Chinese Mode”of Fiscal Decentralization and Monetary Centralization

作　　者：丁骋骋[1] 傅勇[2,3] 

机构地区：[1]浙江财经学院金融学院 [2]中国人民银行上海总部 [3]中国社科院金融研究所

出　　处：《经济社会体制比较》2012年第6期87-97,共11页Comparative Economic & Social Systems

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(项目编号:10YJC790046);国家哲学社会科学基金项目(项目编号:11CJL008)

摘　　要：中国经济改革经历多次"放权—收权"的周期循环,这不仅体现在财政改革上,也体现在金融改革上。文章从财政—金融交织的视角,探讨中国经济体制改革的内在逻辑及其宏观绩效。研究发现,建国之后特别是改革开放以来,中央与地方在反复博弈中形成财政分权和金融集权的体制框架,由此影响到地方政府行为和资源配置,并最终改善了宏观经济运行。中央一方面通过财政分权激励地方为经济增长而竞争;另一方面为限制地方竞争的金融杠杆及其引发的经济过热,在金融体制上仍维持相对集权以保留调控抓手。中央与地方在财政金融体制设计上的成功,可以对改革开放以来的宏观绩效特别是20世纪90年代中期以来经济周期的平稳化趋势,给出有力解释。China＇s fiscal system reform and financial system reform have experienced several cycles of centraliza- tion and decentralization. This paper investigates the internal logic of China＇s economic reforms, and evaluates their macro - economic performance from the perspective of public finance - finance interaction. We show that an institutional framework of fiscal decentralization and monetary centralization has come about as a result of re- peated interaction between the central and local governments, which has affected local governments＇ patterns of behavior and improved overall macro - economic performance. The central government has encouraged local competition for economic growth through fiscal decentralization, while at the same time it has preserved its strict financial control to limit local＇s leverage and reduce macro fluctuations. The successful design of the fiscal - fi- nancial system has contributed significantly to macro - economic performance after the Open Door Reforms, es- pecially during the mid - 1990s.

关 键 词：财政分权 金融集权 中国式分权 经济周期 

分 类 号：F812.4[经济管理—财政学]