一个VMI系统中的纳什讨价还价模型  

Nash Bargaining Model of a VMI System

作　　者：卿前恺[1] 刘志学[1] 施文[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2012年第5期90-96,103,共8页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672039;71072034)

摘　　要：研究一个单供应商单制造商的VMI系统。通过将纳什讨价还价(议价)引入零部件价格决策过程,我们发现,制造商的收益总是随着其议价能力的增强而增加,而供应商的收益却可能会随着其议价能力的增强而减少;存在使供应商利润最大化的供应商最优议价能力。同时,供应商最优议价能力受供应商物流决策的影响。具体而言,最优议价能力在运输业务外包时可能增加或减小,在库存业务外包时增加。此外,供应商最优议价能力也受需求函数特性的影响。This paper studies a VMI system with one supplier and one manufacturer. The Nash bargaining is incorporated into the process of determining the component ＇ s price. We discover that the manufacturer＇s profit always increases with his bargaining power. However,the supplier＇s profit may decrease with her bargaining power; there exists an optimal bargaining power for the supplier. We also find that the optimal bargaining power for the supplier is impacted by the supplier＇s logistics decision; more specifically,it may increase or decrease if the business on transportation is outsourced and will increase if the business on inventory is outsourced. Furthermore, the optimal bargaining power for the supplier is also influenced by the characteristic of demand function.

关 键 词：VMI 纳什讨价还价 议价能力 物流外包 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]