基于进化博弈模型的科技保险险种创新行为研究  

Research on Behavior of Products Innovation of Science and Technology Insurance Based on Evolutionary Game Model

作　　者：赵湜[1] 谢科范[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学管理学院,武汉430070

出　　处：《软科学》2012年第11期53-57,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家软科学研究计划项目(2010GXS5D241)

摘　　要：采用以有限理性假设为前提的进化博弈理论作为分析工具,构建了科技保险险种创新进化博弈模型,进而对双方主体策略的进化稳定性进行了分析,并以C保险公司为例,通过构建系统动力学模型,运用虚拟数据进行了模拟计算。然后,基于对险种创新主体行为的分析,对险种创新促进策略进行了探讨。研究结果表明:保险公司选择开发新险种策略的基础是新险种所带来的超额收益;政府干预险种创新的基础是我国科技保险市场具有活力,且干预行为具有良好的社会效应;在博弈过程中,只要有一方主动选择积极策略,则另一方也会逐步向积极的方向发展。This paper adopts the evolutionary game theory, which is on the assumption of bounded rationality, as analysis tool and structures the evolutionary game model of products innovation of science technology insurance, then analyses the evolutionary stable strategies of both subjects. Through structuring system dynamics model, the case of coinsurance Company is analog computed using virtual data. Finally, on the basis ofanalyzing the subjects＇ behavior of insurance products innovation, this paper discusses the promoting strategy of insurance products innovation. Result shows that ： first, the basis of insurance companyadopting the strategy of insurance products innovation is the excess earnings generated by new insurance products. Second, the basis of govemmentpromoting insurance products innovation is that the science and technology insur- ance market is active, and the promotions have a good society benefit. Third, in the game process, so long as one subject adopts positive strategy, the other one will also move in a positive directionstep by step.

关 键 词：科技保险 险种创新 进化博弈 系统动力学 

分 类 号：F840.32[经济管理—保险]