对私募投资中“对赌协议”的法经济学思考——兼评我国首例司法判决  

A Legal and Economic Reflection of Valuation Adjustment Mechanism:Discussion on China's First Judical Precedent

作　　者：李睿鉴[1] 陈若英[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学,北京100871

出　　处：《广东商学院学报》2012年第6期82-90,共9页Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies

摘　　要："对赌协议"是国内外私募投资中普遍使用的合同条款,却一直被我国证券监管部门所否定,并于2011年"海富案"中首次被法院宣布违法而无效。辨析对赌协议的合法性需引入经济学和金融学的视角,探讨其正当经济功能和私募投资的独特财务目标。对赌协议帮助投融资双方应对信息不对称所带来的估值差异并解决代理人道德风险和激励问题。就财务目标而言,私募投资不同于债权投资和传统的股权投资,其所承受的风险和追求的投资目标均远远高于前者。另外,对赌协议并不会影响上市公司股权结构的清晰,不必然损害债权人利益,也并非射幸合同,不违反我国合同法的等价有偿原则,其存在具有一定的合法合规性。Valuation adjustment mechanism （VAM）, often called a ＂two-way gambling agreement＂ in China, is widely used in private equity investment. A 2011 judgment by a Chinese court ruled it illegal. The perspective of economics and finance needs to be introduced to determine the legality of VAM in China and to clarify its legitimate economic function and the unique financial objective of private equity investment. VAM addresses the moral hazard and incentive of the agency problem by bridging the evaluation gap caused by information asymmetry. The financial objective of private equity investors is to bear such a level of risks and to realize a rate of return both of which are much higher than creditor investment and traditional equity investment. Meanwhile, VAM does not necessarily sacrifice the transparency of shareholding structure of lis- ted companies or damage creditors of the company invested. It is not an aleatory contract, and it is in com- pliance with the principle of fairness under China＇ s contract law.

关 键 词：对赌协议 私募投资 保底条款 射幸合同 海富案 

分 类 号：D922.287[政治法律—经济法学] D923.6[政治法律—法学]