地方政府官员的考核与激励——基于一个委托代理模型的分析  

Evaluating and Motivating China’s Local Officials: An Analysis Based on a PrincipleAgent Model

作　　者：王哲伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院

出　　处：《山东大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2012年第6期74-80,共7页Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：山东省社会科学研究项目"转型经济下网络型产业竞争政策设计研究"(项目批号11CJJJ04)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：中央政府强激励下的地方政府竞争是中国经济在过去30年快速增长关键原因。通过分析一个多任务的委托代理模型可以发现:首先,中央政府对于GDP数量增加的强激励会减弱地方政府进行其他任务的努力,从而带来偏离社会最优的扭曲。其次,中央政府的最优激励程度应随着经济的发展水平的提高而降低。因此,在现阶段的经济落后地区,继续实施以GDP数量增长为主要考核目标的强激励是可行的;但对于经济发达地区,中央政府应大幅度降低对GDP数量增长的激励。讨论了中央政府向地方政府在GDP数量增长和GDP质量提高两个方面同时提供较强激励的可能性,并给出了相关政策建议。Competition among local governments motivated by the central government has been considered to be a key reason for China＇ s rapid economic growth in the recent 30 years. By analyzing a muhi-task principle-agent model, we find that a strong motivation for increasing GDP in quantity will certainly cause a distortion compared with the first-best; the optimal amount of the motivation depends on the level of the economic development. The motivation should be strong in the less developed area and it should be lessened in the more developed area. We also offer some suggestions for the central government on how to maintain strong motivations for both increasing GDP in quantity and improving GDP＇ s quality simultaneously at the present stage.

关 键 词：地方官员激励 扭曲 GDP数量 GDP质量 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] F224[政治法律—中外政治制度]