基于多期信贷竞争的外资银行进入模式研究  

Entry modes of foreign banks in the multi-phase credit competition

作　　者：刘彬[1] 曾勇[1] 李强[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2012年第11期76-90,共15页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872016)

摘　　要：银行业全面开放后,外资银行可以绿地投资或作为本地银行的战略投资者两种模式进入.本文考虑本地银行具有老客户和甄别能力带来的信息优势,外资银行具有信贷成本优势,首先在银行不损失优质老客户利润的竞争规则下,将单期信贷模型扩展到多期,然后利用多期竞争的结论对两种进入模式进行了研究.结论表明:与单期信贷竞争中本地银行信息优势来源于老客户和甄别能力两方面不同,在多期信贷竞争中,本地银行信息优势主要来源于甄别能力,并成为外资银行绿地投资的进入壁垒;在少数股权政策的限制下,为了消除信息劣势,外资银行倾向于入股因拥有甄别能力而具有长期信息优势的本地银行,因此少数股权政策可以保护本地弱势银行不被外资并购.With the full opening-up of the banking industry,foreign banks are allowed to enter the Chinese credit market either through Greenfield investment or by cooperating with the Chinese banks as strategic investors.Under the assumption that the foreign bank has the cost advantage and the domestic bank has the information advantage from old customers and screening,this paper first extends the single-phase credit competition model to the multi-phase,and then studies the entry modes of foreign banks in the multi-phase credit competition.The results show that,unlike that both the information advantage from old customers and screening can affect the equilibrium in the single-phase competition,only the information advantage from screening can affect the multi-phase competition equilibrium.With regard to the entry modes of foreign banks,the results suggest that the information advantage from screening is a barrier to Greenfield investment.Under the policy that foreign banks can only become minority shareholders of domestic banks,a foreign bank will tend to buy the share of the domestic bank with screening in order to eliminate the information disadvantage,and thus the policy can protect the weaker domestic bank from merging.

关 键 词：外资银行 多期信贷竞争 进入模式 少数股权 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学] F406.7