基于信号博弈的电子政务外包服务提供商选择研究  

Study on E-Government Outsourcing Service Providers' Selection Based on Signaling Game

作　　者：陈东灵[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,厦门361005

出　　处：《天津大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第6期497-501,共5页Journal of Tianjin University：Social Sciences

摘　　要：文章构建了单一信号传递和双重信号传递的电子政务外包提供商选择模型,分析了混同均衡、分离均衡、准分离均衡等3种精炼贝叶斯均衡。研究发现,双重信号传递不存在混同均衡,意味着信号空间的增加提高了政府对提供商的观察能力。This paper has built e-government outsourcing providers selecting models of single signal transmission and dual signals transmission,analyzed three kinds of perfect Bayesian equilibriums,which include pooling equilibrium,separating equilibrium and semi-separating equilibrium.Study has found that pooling equilibrium is not exist in dual signals transmission,which indicates that increasing of signal space has improved government＇s ability to observe providers.

关 键 词：信号传递博弈 电子政务外包 提供商选择 

分 类 号：F244.32[经济管理—劳动经济]