和平-强成本假设下智猪博弈的局势可能性  

POSSIBILITIES OF SITUATIONS OF BOXED PIGS BASED ON PEACE-STRONG COST ASSUMPTION

作　　者：姜殿玉[1] 

机构地区：[1]淮海工学院对策论及其应用研究所,连云港222005

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2012年第9期1145-1154,共10页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70871051)资助课题

摘　　要：作为双行动带熵博弈局势分析学的一个应用案例,建立了一种以开发时间不可忽略的非专利技术开发问题为背景的和平-强成本假设下的智猪博弈逻辑系统.用逻辑法研究了此系统中各个局势的可能性大小的排序及其充分条件.结论是:设社会成员做具有公共福利性质的事情时都劳有其利,且同时享受其福利,则弱势群体"搭便车"等价于完成该事情的劳动量足够大;当这种劳动量足够小时,弱势群体的劳动积极性高于强势群体.As an application example of situation analysis of double action games with entropy, a logical system of boxed pigs is developed based on peace and strong cast assumptions with the background that the time for a generic technology development can not be ignored. By logical methods, we obtain the orders of possibilities of situations in the system and their sufficient conditions. The conclusion is as follows. Let every social member do a thing with public welfare and have his profit, and let all the members enjoy the welfare at the same time, then the weak ＂hitchhiking＂ is equivalent to that the amount of labor of completing the thing is large enough; and if the amount of labor is small enough, the weak＇s labor enthusiasm is greater than the strong＇s.

关 键 词：和平-强成本假设 智猪博弈 局势 可能性 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F273.1