基于隐式拍卖的跨区(省)电力交易模型研究  

Trans-regional Electricity Trading Model Based on Implicit Auction

作　　者：曾鸣[1] 李晓彤[1,2] 倪红芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学经济与管理学院,北京102206 [2]中国南方电网有限责任公司,广东广州510623

出　　处：《水电能源科学》2012年第12期190-192,216,共4页Water Resources and Power

摘　　要：针对跨区(省)电力交易中价格缺乏公平合理性、上网电价偏低及输电费用偏高、发电企业利益受损的现象,建立了基于隐式拍卖的跨区(省)电力交易模型。通过电力交易和阻塞同时被管制时修订区域内市场的竞价函数,从竞价效应、电量效应角度优化跨区(省)电力交易的利益分配,以实现区域内各参与主体的利益均衡,促进电力交易的可持续发展。Aiming at the lack of fairness and rationality in trans-regional electricity trading, low bidding pricing, high transmission cost and profit loss of generating company, trans-regional electricity trading model is established based on implicit auction. This model intends to revise the bidding function in the market under the situation that power transaction and congestion are regulated simultaneously. The profit distribution of trans-regional （province） electricity trading is opti- mized on the basis of bidding effect and generated energy effect. So, it achieves the balance of interest among each subject and promotes the sustainable development of power transaction.

关 键 词：电力跨区交易 隐式拍卖 互联系统 竞价价格 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F123.13[经济管理—世界经济]