WTO争端解决机制的报复措施  

Retaliation Measures in the WTO Dispute Settlement System

作　　者：宋俊荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海政法学院国际法学院,上海201701

出　　处：《商业研究》2012年第12期207-211,共5页Commercial Research

摘　　要：总体而言,WTO争端解决机制的报复措施在促进裁决执行方面的效果还不尽如人意,这主要缘于报复对报复国自身经济的伤害,"多边授权、单方实施"给发展中国家带来的难题,以及报复力度不够、威慑力不足。目前,WTO各方提出的改革建议主要有集体报复、加大报复力度、强化交叉报复以及金钱补偿,但是在当前DSU谈判前景尚不明朗的情况下,较为务实的做法应当是寻求WTO争端解决实践的突破和转变。For a number of reasons, retaliation measures in the WTO dispute settlement system have been criticized for being ineffective and undesirable remedy. Firstly, retaliation is self- defeating. Secondly, many small and developing countries lack sufficient power to counteract an illegal commercial behavior of more powerful countries. Thirdly, retaliation is prospective, which leaves past wrongs uncompensated. The proposals on retaliation raised by WTO members include collective retaliation, increasing the level of retaliation, reinforcing cross - retaliation and monetary compensation. Currently, the prospect of negotiations on DSU is very unclear. Therefore, to promote breakthrough and changes in WTO dispute settlement practice is more practicable.

关 键 词：报复 WTO 争端解决 

分 类 号：F744[经济管理—国际贸易]