跨国公司逆向避税的博弈分析  

The Game Analysis of Transnational Corporation Reverse Tax Avoidance

作　　者：孙立新[1] 

机构地区：[1]红河学院商学院,云南蒙自661100

出　　处：《科技和产业》2012年第12期161-163,共3页Science Technology and Industry

基　　金：国家级特色专业"国际经济与贸易专业建设项目"(TS12468);云南省哲学社会科学研究基地重点课题(JD2010ZD25);红河学院国际经济与贸易专业教学团队建设项目(TD1001)

摘　　要：逆向避税损害了东道国的税收管辖权,影响了东道国的国际收支平衡,造成东道国的资本外流和境内外厂商之间的不公平竞争。逆向避税的形成既有利益驱动原因、规避风险原因,也有战略驱动原因,文章基于博弈论视角,分析了逆向避税所采用的转让定价、资本弱化等主要手段,提出了反逆向避税的转让定价、资本弱化策略。Reverse tax avoidance is damage to the host＇s tax jurisdiction and influences the host＇s balance of international payments, causes the host country to capital outflows and the unfair competition between domestic and foreign manufacturers. Reverse tax avoidance is formed with both in- terest drive, avoiding the risk of reasons cause and strategic driving causes, this article analysis of reverse tax avoidance by transfer pricing, capital weakening the main means from the perspective of game theory, the paper proposes the reverse tax avoidance transfer pricing, thin capitalization strategy.

关 键 词：逆向避税 转让定价 资本弱化 交易价格方法 

分 类 号：F740.45[经济管理—国际贸易]