国际铁矿石长期协议价格决定机制解析  

An Analysis on the Mechanism of Long-term Contract Price of Iron ore in International Trade

作　　者：■盛中 张履康[1] 王文平[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,210096

出　　处：《上海经济研究》2012年第12期44-53,共10页Shanghai Journal of Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70973017);教育部人文社科规划项目(09YJAG30020);江苏省哲学社会科学研究基地项目(09JD018);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(2011ZDAXM009)

摘　　要：建立了国际铁矿石长期协议价格谈判机制多方博弈模型,借助模型推导了不同情形下价格谈判的均衡价格和各方收益,解析出谈判各方地位、策略、成本、经济联系以及市场需求等因素对均衡价格的影响。研究结果表明,导致近年来国际铁矿石供求双方利益严重失衡和价格处于高位的原因并不在于国际铁矿石价格谈判机制本身,而是由于与价格相关的多种因素的共同作用。本文研究结果有助于客观认识沿用多年的国际铁矿石长期协议价格决定机制的特点和适用的环境,对我国钢铁企业寻求合理的国际铁矿石价格的努力具有一定的借鉴意义。By constructing a game model to analyze the negotiation mechanism of long-term contract price of iron ore in international trade, calculating the possible equilibrium price and the corresponding payoff under different circumstances and analyzing the influence of the negotiators status, strategies, cost, economic connection and market condition on equilibrium price and the corresponding payoff, this paper revealed that the factors mentioned above are the causes of unbalancing payoff＇ and uprising long- term contract price. Findings from this paper could help us gain an objective understanding of the characteristics of the negotiation mechanism and the circumstances in which the negotiation mechanism is applicable, and serve as reference for Chinese steel companies when they attempt to seek a reasonable price of iron ore in international trade.

关 键 词：铁矿石 长期协议价格 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F740.41[经济管理—国际贸易]